August
31
Introduction
I.What is
philosophy?
Unit 1: Descartes and Skepticism (August 31-September 21)
I.
Introduction to Descartes’s Meditations
Recommended:
Sorell, Descartes, 63-66 (top); (e-reserve); Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Ref B41.E5), Volume 2, 354-61; Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ref B 51.R68), Volume 3, 6-13.
II.
Extreme (exaggerated or “hyperbolic”) doubt (numbers below correspond to the
paragraphs of the Mediation)
A.
Why Descartes is resolved to place all of his beliefs in doubt: 1.1
B.
Why offer skeptical arguments at all? 1.2
C.
Sense deception argument
1.
D’s presentation: 1.3
2.
D’s rejection: 1.4
D.
Dream argument
1.
D’s presentation: 1.5
2.
D’s rejection: 1.6-1.8
E.
Deceptive God argument: 1.9-1.11
F.
The evil demon: 1.12
Additional
reading:
III.
Initial absolute (“metaphysical”) certainties: Meditation 2
A.
Summary of the results of Med 1: 2.1-2.2
B.
The cogito: 2.3
C.
Related beliefs that survive extreme doubt: 2.4-2.9
Additonal reading:
IV.
God’s existence and the attempt to remove extreme doubt: Meditation 3
A.
Summary of Meds 1 and 2: 3.1-3.4
B.
D’s criterion of truth: 3.2;
C.
God’s existence and the removal of extreme doubt: 3.4 (See also 5.12-5.16)
D.
The attempt to show that some of D’s ideas must be caused from without
1.
First effort: 3.5-3.12
2.
Second effort; appeal to the causal principle: 3.13-3.21
E.
D’s (first) proof for God's existence (The Trademark Argument): 3.22-3.24;
F. Arnauld’s
objection (The Cartesian Circle)
Blackburn, 37-40; Arnauld (e-res, under Descartes): 142.5-142.6.
V.
Assessment of Descartes
Questions to bear in mind as you
read Descartes
1.
What are D’s overall goals in the Meditations?
2.
What role does extreme doubt play in D’s project?
3.
What role do skeptical arguments play in the execution of extreme doubt?
4.
What are the main skeptical arguments that D presents in Meditation 1
and what does he make of them?
5.
What is it about D’s existence in particular that resists extreme doubt?
6.
Given that D can be absolutely (“metaphysically”) certain that he exists, what
else does he think that he can be absolutely certain of? (See
Meditation 2.4-2.9.)
7.
What criterion of truth does D claim to discover? What's the relationship
between D’s acceptance of this criterion and the existence of a non-deceiving
God?
8.
What is D’s (first) proof for the existence of God? How does Arnauld criticize this?
9.
Is the moral of Descartes’s “story” that there is no
way to overcome complete skepticism?
First paper due: Wednesday, September 28
Unit 2.
Arguments for and against God’s existence (September 21-October 24)
Note
about class meetings: We have class on Tuesday, October 11; no class
Wednesday, October 5, Monday, October 10, and Wednesday, October 12.
I.
Background: The concept of God; why there has to be some consensus at the
outset
II. The first cause argument A. What’s the one thing that
the theist claims that the atheist can’t satisfactorily explain?
B. The argument itself
C. Objections
1. Hume’s contention that the universe isn’t a thing
2. What caused God?/Why assume
that the universe must have had a cause?
3. The theist left with two mysteries, the atheist only
with one
4. Even if universe had a cause, no reason to suppose that
it=God
III. The argument from design (the teleological argument)
A. The argument itself
1. What analogy does the argument try to establish between
human-made machines on the one hand and components of the universe on the
other?
a. Cleanthes
b. Paley
2. Why does the defender of the argument claim we have to
appeal to God?
B. Darwin’s theory
of evolution and the argument from design
1. Why before
2. The fundamentals of
a. Random, heritable mutations
b. Natural selection
3. Why
Recommended reading: The Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ref B51.R68), Volume 1, 533-34.
C. Hume’s objections
1. Why select thought as a model for the universe?
2. The universe doesn’t seem to be perfect.
3. Even if the universe is perfect, no proof that God is
4. Philo's challenge to the machine analogy: the universe
at least as much like an animal or vegetable as like a machine
5. Many gods more likely than one god
6. No reason to prefer any of the following designer
hypotheses
a. God
b. Infant god
c. Subordinate god
d. Senile god
Recommended
reading: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ref B41.E5), Volume 8, 85-87; The
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ref
B51.R68), Volume 4, 89-91; Richard Dawkins, "The Path to Complex Life is
one of the Greatest Human Insights in History." New Scientist, September 17, 2005.
Also, there’s been
a lot of discussion in the news lately about intelligent design theory, which
is a version of the argument from design. Here are some recent articles: Jerry
Coyne, “The Faith that dare not speak its name: the case against intelligent
design.” The New Republic, August 22
& 29, 2005; Cornelia Dean, “Scientists speak up on mix of God and science, The New York Times, August
23, 2005; Kenneth Chang, “In explaining life’s complexity, Darwinists and
doubters clash, The New York Times, August
22, 2005; Jodi Wilgoren, “Politicized scholars put
evolution on the defensive.” The New York
Times, August 21, 2005. Peter Steinfels, “A
Catholic professor on evolution and theology: to understand one, it helps to
understand the other. The New York Times, August
21, 2005.
IV. The Problem of Evil
A. What is it?
1. Why does the atheist claim that there would be no evil
if an all-good, all-powerful being existed?
2. What does it mean to say that God’s existence is
incompatible with the fact of evil?
B. The theist’s response
1. Free will
a. What is it?
b. How it (apparently) solves the problem of moral evil
C. The problem of natural evil
D. The theist’s response
1. Natural evil needed for higher goods
2. Without natural evil there would be no moral virtues
like patience and courage
E. The atheist’s objection to this
F. Theist: Evil has to be seen in overall context
1. All evil leads to good
2. All evil necessary to produce the abundance of good that
we find in the universe
G. The atheist’s objection to this: Why so much?
Recommended reading: Swinburne, “Why God Allows Evil” (in
Feinberg): 89-97; The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ref B41.E5), Volume 3,
139-40.
V. Pascal’s Wager
A. What are Pascal’s assumptions?
B. Why is his wager not really an
argument for God’s existence?
C. Why does Pascal think that it’s
more reasonable to behave as if God exists than otherwise?
D. Criticisms
1. No way to know that God doesn't
reward non-believers and punish believers
2. Why assume that God, if he
exists, favors Catholics?
a. Maybe he's a Protestant God.
b. Maybe Zeus is the true God.
3. Perhaps God is a recluse and
prefers not to be worshipped.
Midterm, Wednesday, October 26
Unit 3 Ethics (October 31-November 21)
Second Paper due: Wednesday, November 16
I.
What is ethics?
Reading:
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, ch 1
(e-reserve)
II. Cultural Relativism
A. What is it?
B. Argument for: the argument from cultural diversity
C. Objection to the argument from cultural diversity:
disagreement about moral standards doesn't show that neither society is
correct.
D. General criticisms: Consequences of taking CR seriously
1. We can't say that the moral practices of some cultures
are superior or inferior to our own.
2. We could tell whether an action was right or wrong just
by looking at the standards a given culture.
3. We have to deny that there could be moral progress.
E. Why there’s less disagreement than there seems
1. Inuits and infanticide
2. Inuits and the elderly
F. Values that all cultures have in common
1. Care for young
2. Rules against lying and deception
3. Stern prohibitions against murder
Reading: Rachels, From Elements
of Moral Philosophy: (e-res); Nussbaum, 622-630 (in Feinberg); “Entrenched
Epidemic: Wife-Beatings in
IV. Two types of moral theory
A. Deontology
Recommended reading: Ross in Feinberg, 608.3-611.1; pay
special attention to 608.3-609.1 and 610.2; The Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Ref B41.E5), Volume 7, 216-17.
B. Utilitarianism
V. Mill and Utilitarianism
A. Fundamentals of the theory
1. The principle of utility
2. The principle of equal consideration of interests
3. Rules of thumb
4. The right action vs. good actions; the wrong action vs.
bad actions: Hitler case 1909
B. Questions on Mill’s Utilitarianism
1. What does Mill
mean when he says that “as between his own happiness and that of others,
utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested
spectator”?
2. What does Mill
mean when he claims that “utility would enjoin...that laws and social
arrangements should place the happiness or...interest of every individual as
nearly as possible in harmony with the interests of the whole.”
3. How does Mill respond to the objection to utilitarianism
“that there is not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the
effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness”? What role do
so-called rules of thumb play in Mill’s response? What role do the traveling
and navigational analogies play in his response?
4. How could the last paragraph in the reading
(606-07) be interpreted as a response to deontologists?
C. Response to the criticisms of the deontologists
1. Morally significant relations and the trolley case
2. Promise-keeping and rules of thumb
a. How does the utilitarian propose to resolve conflicts
between (or among) rules of thumb?
b. Why can the utilitarian offer reasons for why we
generally ought to follow the rules of thumb?
VI. Singer and our obligations to
those suffering from famine.
A. What point is Singer trying to
make with his Concorde and Sydney Opera House examples?
B. What conclusion does Singer
propose to argue for in this essay?
C. Singer makes two main
assumptions. What are they? Are they correct?
D. How do you think Singer would
respond to the claim that we should “help our own” before we help those who are
suffering halfway around the world?
E. What does Singer say about the view that “numbers lessen
obligation?”
F. Why does Singer deny that the traditional distinction
between duty and charity can be drawn as we normally draw it?
G. What does Singer say about the consequences that our
philosophical conclusions should have for action?
H. Killing vs. letting die
1. Why does Singer claim that there's no intrinsic
difference between killing and letting die?
2. What bearing does this have on his claim that
indulging luxury in a world in which people die of malnutrition isn't morally
justified?
I. Criticism of Singer and utilitarianism
1. Uism seems to demand too much
from people.
2. How is this a criticism of
utilitarianism?
Second paper due: Wednesday, November 16
Unit 4: Justice and Political Philosophy (November
23-December 14)
I.
Fundamental issues in political philosophy
A.
Should we have government at all?
B.
What obligations do we have to follow the law?
C.
What powers is the state justified in having?
D.
What is justice?
II.
The State
A.
Powers that the state has that private citizens or organizations don't have
1.
Arrest
2.
Detention
3.
Use of force
4.
Draft
5.
Raise taxes
B.
Why the state needs a moral justification
III.
Nozick and the minimal state
A.
Rights and the minimal state
1. Rights
and the state of nature
2.
Rights and the obligations of the minimal state
3.
Rights not surrendered to the minimal state
B.
The entitlement theory of justice
1.
What is entitlement?
2.
Welfare programs as involving forced labor
3.
Tim Duncan case
C.
Possible problem for Nozick's theory: radical
redistribution
1.
Legitimate act of original acquisition
2.
Likelihood that many of the holdings in the
D.
Criticisms
1.
Minimal state seems unfair
2.
Nozick offers no justification for his rights
III.
Rawls’s theory
A.
Justice as fairness
B.
Choosing the principles of justice
1.
The original position
2.
The veil of ignorance
3.
Self interested individuals in the original position
C.
How the veil of ignorance is supposed to ensure fairness
D.
Why the principles chosen behind the veil must be the principles of justice
E.
The original agreement
1.
Equality principle
2.
Difference principle
F.
How Rawls would justify higher pay for some occupations and lower pay for
others
G.
Nozick's criticism of Rawls
1.
People wouldn't necessarily get what they're entitled to
2.
Justice more than a pattern of distribution
H.
Rawls's response
Reading:
“Justice as Fairness” (in Feinberg), 554-557; 561.3-563; Jeffrey Olen, from Persons
and Their World, “Justice, Rights, and the Social Contract,” 110-13; 116-18
(e-reserve).
Recommended
reading: The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought (articles on
Libertarianism, Rawls, and Utilitarianism). The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement (Ref B41.E5), 490-91 (top right).
The Routledge Encylopedia of Philosophy, Volume 8, 106-7.
IV.
Nozick, Rawls, and utilitarianism
A.
Why Nozick rejects utilitarianism
B.
Why Rawls rejects utilitarianism
1.
Distributive justice
2.
How would Rawls attempt to show that there’s a conflict between the principle
of utility and the difference principle?
C.
The utilitarian’s response to Rawls
1.
Why the utilitarian isn’t (directly) concerned with the distribution of
happiness
2.
Why the utilitarian is (indirectly) concerned with how the means to happiness
get distributed
3.
Why the utilitarian wouldn’t accept Rawls’s two principles as universal rules
4.
Why the utilitarian would probably accept Rawls’s two principles as useful
policy-making rules of thumb
Reading:
J.J.C. Smart (e-reserve), “Distributive Justice and Utilitarianism,” 411-15;
skip paragraph 2, 413.
Unit
5: The meaning of life (December 14; time permitting)